We study a two-country model where two firms, one domestic and the other foreign, must decide when to introduce their new product into a market. The home government may apply an import tariff, an administrative delay, or both to the product of the foreign firm. An administrative delay imposes a waiting period between the time when the quality of the foreign product is determined and the time when the product can actually be sold. Our main interest is the differential effect of the tariff and the administrative delay on the timing of new product introductions and the resulting change in home, foreign and world welfare. We show that administrative delays are less efficient instruments for maximizing home welfare than tariffs. With a tariff, the home government can affect the timing of entry to ensure that the domestic firm moves first at the socially optimal date. Although an optimally chosen delay can achieve the same pattern of introduction, it does not yield any tariff revenues. As a result, if the tariff may be set optimally, administrative delays are not used in a discriminatory manner. If trade liberalization constrains the import tariff to be below its domestically optimal level, discriminatory administrative delays may become part of the optimal policy of the home country. As the optimal delay policy leads to lower levels of world welfare than the optimal tariff, trade liberalization can be welfare decreasing.
Introduction
International trade in goods and services is restricted by a variety of governmental policies. Most prominent among these are trade policies that are explicitly designed to discriminate against products that are produced abroad. Trade policies take many forms from explicit tariffs or quotas to voluntary export restraints or the enforcement of anti-dumping laws. International trade flows also are affected by policies that apply to both foreign and domestic firms, such as tax policies, intellectual property laws, safety standards or technical standards. These "internal" policies can impede trade in basically two ways. First, the policies can be applied in a discriminatory manner: the relevant authorities can systematically take more time or be less accommodating when dealing with foreign products or foreign firms. Second, domestic firms might simply be more familiar with the local procedures so that local regulation is less of a burden for them than for their foreign competitors. In this case, a country effectively can discriminate against foreign firms by adopting idiosyncratic rules and ignoring attempts to standardize administrative procedures across countries.
There is some evidence of systematic pro-domestic bias in the application of domestic policies. For example, the fact that most companies obtain significantly more patents at home than in other important markets suggests that they perceive the costs of filing and litigating abroad as higher than at home.
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There also appears to be some systematic differences in the speed of administrative review of new products. The work of Dranove and Meltzer (1994) suggests that administrative delays may be greater for foreign-owned drug firms, and that the additional administrative delay suffered by foreign firms differs across countries. For example, they find that French-made drugs have a "dramatic" advantage of approval within France while German-made drugs have a large advantage in Germany. US made drugs are found to be approved two to three years earlier in the United States than in France, the United Kingdom or Germany. Such bias can be privately and socially costly. Dranove and Meltzer (1994) find that the average time from initial human subject testing until final FDA approval of drugs was nine years during he 1980s while Gieringer (1985) 1 Another possible explanation for the discrepancy is that foreign companies feel that their products will not sell as well abroad because of the consumers' preference for domestic products. Expecting fewer sales, foreign companies would be less likely to invest in obtaining the patent even if the cost of patenting were the same at home and abroad. Still, this does not explain why international firms based in small countries would have a greater propensity to patent at home than in much larger markets like the US.
estimates that a one year delay in the introduction of new drugs results in between 32,000 and 76,000 additional deaths per decade. This paper analyzes the special case of discriminatory administrative delays in the approval of new product designs. We study a two-country model where two firms, one domestic and the other foreign, must decide when to introduce their new product into a market. By waiting longer a firm increases the quality of its product but forgoes the current stream of profits. In the sub-game perfect equilibrium of our model, the timing of introduction and the quality of both the domestic and the foreign goods are determined endogenously. The home government may apply an import tariff, an administrative delay or both to the product of the foreign firm. An administrative delay imposes a waiting period between the time when the quality of the foreign product is determined and the time when the product can be sold. Our main interest is the differential effect of the tariff and the administrative delay on the timing of new product introduction and the resulting change in home, foreign and world welfare. We attempt to answer three questions. First, can delays be an effective form of trade policy and, if the answer is "yes", what would an optimal "delay" policy look like? Second, how do administrative delays compare to traditional trade instruments such as a unit import tariff? Are these instruments equally efficient from the point of view of the home country? Do they affect world welfare in a similar manner? Finally, how would the home government and the firms react to a trade liberalization that imposes limits on the level of import tariffs? How would such trade liberalization affect the endogenous quality of the products? Would it necessarily improve world welfare?
The last question is of particular importance. As multilateral trade agreements progressively limit the use of the more traditional trade policy tools, policy makers are likely to make greater use of instruments that remain unregulated or that are harder to effectively monitor for evidence of discrimination. In fact, the virtual elimination of formal import quotas and the strict limits imposed on most import tariffs seems to be one of the reasons behind the proliferation of "voluntary" export restraint agreements and the flourishing of anti-dumping actions. The potential for substitution has long been recognized by the GATT/WTO as the later rounds of discussion have tried -without much success --to address the issue of internal barriers to international trade.
Our results suggest that administrative delays are less efficient instruments for maximizing home welfare than tariffs. With a tariff, the home government can affect the timing of entry to ensure that the domestic firm moves first at the socially optimal date. Although an optimally chosen delay can achieve the same pattern of introduction, it does not yield any tariff revenues. As a result, if the tariff may be set optimally, administrative delays are not used in a discriminatory manner. Delays also lead to lower world-wide welfare than tariffs. Essentially this is because delays impose a period of unproductive waiting while a tariff lets the foreign firm improve the quality of its product right up to the date of introduction. If trade liberalization constrains the import tariff to be below its domestically optimal level, discriminatory administrative delays may become part of the optimal policy of the home country. As the optimal delay policy leads to lower levels of world welfare than the optimal tariff, trade liberalization can be welfare decreasing.
To our knowledge, the formal analysis of administrative delays is new to the literature on international trade 2 . On the other hand, the effect of tariff protection on the optimal timing of technology adoption has been studied in two papers 3 . Myagiwa and Ohno (1995) discuss how import restrictions can affect a home firm's incentives to "close the technology gap" with respect to a foreign competitor. They use a technology adoption model that is similar to ours 4 but assume that the foreign firm has already adopted the new technology. They then focus on how tariffs and quotas would affect the date at which the domestic competitor would also adopt. They cannot, however, examine, as we do, how trade policies influence the order to technological adoption between foreign and domestic firms. Chuman and Kusumoto (1995) extend the analysis of Myagiwa and Ohno to compare price and quantity setting competition under various specifications of demands. They show that the effect of tariff protection on the adoption behaviour of the domestic firm does indeed depend on the nature of competition as well as on the precise shapes of demand and cost functions. We eschew such complications by assuming that consumer demand is perfectly inelastic at any point in time.
This drastic simplification has numerous advantages. First, as mentioned above, it makes it possible to study the timing decisions of both the foreign and the domestic firms. Indeed, the interaction between the firms' adoption strategies is central to our analysis. Second, with inelastic demands the profit-maximizing behaviour of a single firm would be socially optimal. This ensures that all distortions arising in our model are rooted in the rivalry between the domestic and foreign producers.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents our benchmark freetrade model. Section 3 analyses the case where the home country has only the tariff at its disposal while Section 4 considers the exclusive use of administrative delays. Section 5 compares the optimal policies of Sections 3 and 4 and examines 2 Noll (1985) is an older but useful synthesis of the work of many authors from other social sciences who have studied administrative delays.
3 Also see Brander and Spencer (1983) for a classic analysis of the relationship between trade policies and innovation. 4 They assume that the cost of adopting the new technology decreases over time while we assume that the quality of the product increases over time. The basic logic of these two classes of models is very similar. the effect of trade liberalization, allowing the home government to use both instruments simultaneously. Section 6 discusses the robustness of our results to changes in the timing of the policy decisions and in the type of demand functions. Section 7 concludes. Most proofs have been relegated to the Appendix.
The Model and Benchmark Case
Two firms, A and B, must determine when to introduce their product in the market. Before time zero, neither firm is ready to sell a product that would be acceptable to consumers. From time zero on, each firm can introduce a product that incorporates the "state of the art" technology at the time of introduction. The rate of technological progress is exogenous to the firms. The longer the firm waits, the higher the quality of the good it can sell. More specifically, the quality of the good which is introduced at time t i is q i = θt i . Once a firm has introduced its product, its quality is fixed forever. This captures the idea that a firm cannot keep incorporating new technology into its product as fast once the product as been introduced and the basic design choices have been made 5 . Finally, each firm can make only a single product introduction. The analysis would be essentially unchanged if firms were allowed to continuously incorporate improvements after the date of initial introduction as long as the rate of quality improvement drops from θ to θ L < θ (see Dutta and Rustichini, 1993) . One could also accommodate a larger number of "discrete" introductions as long as the total number of introductions available to each firm was exogenous. This would, however, significantly complicate calculations and detract from the clarity of the presentation 6 . Once a firm has introduced its version of the new good, it can produce at a constant marginal cost, c. For simplicity, we set c equal to zero. Firms compete on prices if both produce in the market.
At each time, t, a mass, N, of new identical consumers arrives in the market. Each of these consumers buys at most one unit of the good. Either this purchase occurs immediately or the consumer disappears from the market forever 7 . A consumer who buys one unit of good j at time t enjoys benefits of V j = q j where q j is the quality of good j. The products of the two firms are not 5 While we believe that this assumption is reasonable, it clearly does not apply to every industry. In particular, in industries where innovation benefits significantly from the input of consumers, the rate of product improvement might in fact be larger once the first generation product has been introduced. 6 On the other hand, this type of timing model does not easily accommodate endogenously determined numbers of discrete introductions. In fact, we are not aware of any oligopoly model where both the number of introductions (or innovations) and their timing (or the intensity of R&D) are endogenous. 7 This assumption is made to rule out strategic waiting behaviour on the part of consumers.
horizontally differentiated so that all consumers always prefer the good that offers them the highest quality-price difference, q j -p j .
We assume that all consumers are located in country A, which is the "home" or the "domestic" market. Firm A is located in country A as well, whereas firm B is located abroad and exports to market A. In our baseline case, country A has no policy instruments at its disposal to affect the firms' behaviour.
We solve for the subgame prefect equilibrium of the continuous time game 8 . The first point is that the two firms will never decide to introduce their products simultaneously.
Simultaneous introduction would drive down equilibrium prices to zero as both firms offer homogeneous products of identical quality. In any equilibrium, then, there will be a "leader" who introduces first and a "follower". Considering the problem of the second mover first, the introduction decision is determined by maximizing the discounted stream of profits that accrue to the follower after entry. Since the follower introduces later it offers the higher quality product. It can then charge a price equal to the difference between the value it offers, V f and the value offered by the leader, V l , and still make all sales. If we define t f as the delay between the introduction date of the leader and the follower, then the revenue earned by the follower per period is:
and the stream of profits of the follower discounted back to the time of entry of the leader is:
Maximizing this with respect to t f we obtain an optimal delay of t f *= r 1 .
Similarly, the leader makes all sales from its date of entry until the follower's date of entry. During this time, the leader can extract the entire consumers' surplus, V l N, as revenue. This leads to the following expression for discounted profits of the leader:
8 This is a slight abuse of language since the concept of subgame perfection is not properly defined in continuous time. One should think of our results as applying to the limit of a discrete time game as the time grid of the game becomes arbitrarily fine. Maximizing this with respect to t L , we obtain an optimal entry date of t L * = r 1 . We will call this the "stand alone" or the "maturation" entry date for the leader. This is the date of introduction which would maximize firm A's profits under the assumption that firm B will introduce its product later after its profitmaximizing delay. It will become important later in the paper to note that the leader's optimal introduction date is independent of the follower's entry date. In other words, the leader's entry date is determined by the trade-off between time of entry and the level of profit (quality of output) attainable per period. The follower's entry date affects the level of profits earned, but not this basic tradeoff, and so does not affect the choice of entry date by the leader.
Having described the profit-maximizing introduction dates of both the leader and follower we can now characterise the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the game 9 . This is illustrated in figure 1 , where the horizontal axis measures the date of introduction of the leader. The discounted value of the follower's profits, Π F , decreases as the leader waits longer to introduce.
On the other hand, given the anticipated optimal reaction of the follower, the 10 . If t p is smaller than t M the profits of the follower at t M are lower than the profits of the leader. The follower would therefore prefer to pre-empt the other firm and move first a little bit before t M so that first introduction at t M can no longer be an equilibrium. This incentive to pre-empt persists as long as leading is more profitable than following. The equilibrium outcome is therefore for one firm to introduce first at t p , where leader and follower make the same profits. The "preemption" date, t p is formally defined as the time of first introduction equalizing the profits of the first and second movers, i.e., t p is such that:
or, substituting t f from above and simplifying, where we have assumed that the domestic firm introduced first. Since the profits of the leader and follower are equalised, the welfare of country A would be the 10 At t M the profits of the follower exceed those of the leader. This does not mean that the "leader" has an incentive to wait further. In any pure strategy equilibrium, each firm "knows" whether it is "destined" to be leader or follower. Hence, the leader maximizes its profits by stopping at t M . See Dutta and Rustichini (1993) . 11 For a formal proof that this is the unique subgame perfect outcome, see Dutta and Rustichini (1993) or Prokop, Regibeau and Rockett (1993) . same if we had assumed that the foreign firm introduced first. The components of this welfare function are shown in figure 2. The domestic firm introduces at time t L and captures instantaneous profits equal to the quality of its product. This quality corresponds to the height of the first rectangle. At t L + t f the foreign firm introduces a product of higher quality. The quality advantage of the foreign firm is the height of the upper rectangle. This quality differential is completely appropriated by the foreign firm, leaving domestic consumers, and hence the home country, with an instantaneous surplus equal to the height of the lower rectangle. Since this height is equal to the quality of the domestic product, the instantaneous welfare of the home country is constant from the date of first introduction onwards. The welfare of the foreign country is equal to the discounted profits of the foreign firm, i.e. to: 
To be able to evaluate the effectiveness of trade policies we must also understand what the socially optimal pattern of introduction is. Consider first the benchmark where both firms are domestic firms. This will give us the world welfare maximizing dates of introduction. We can write: . The delay between first and second introductions is the same as would be chosen by the firms. On the other hand, the socially optimal date of first introduction comes earlier than the privately optimal "stand alone" date of introduction: while the leader only cares about its own profits, the social planner considers the fact that a later date of first introduction also delays the introduction of the better quality second-generation product. Now consider the situation where the social planner can still choose both t L and t f but A is a domestic firm and B is foreign. One can show 12 that the welfare of the home country is maximized if the home firm introduces first at time
The introduction date of the foreign follower is irrelevant. The intuition for this result is straight-forward. Since the foreign firm captures the entire surplus that it creates, the social planner only cares about maximizing the discounted value of the value created by the domestic firm. As the domestic firm also captures the whole consumer surplus during its period of monopoly, the socially optimal date of introduction is equal to the privately optimal "stand alone" date of introduction 13 . At the social optimum we have Hence we see that, in the presence of a foreign firm, the socially optimal introduction date is later than the equilibrium pre-emption date t p . Moreover, the social planner is not indifferent as to the order of introduction: the country is better off if its home firm moves first 14 . Policymakers will therefore be interested in any instrument that can delay the date of first introduction and ensure that the home firm moves first.
Summarizing, then, we have the following results for the benchmark case: 
Tariffs
Assume that the home country A may impose a permanent per unit tariff, µ, on the imports of the foreign firm, B. As we have just seen, for a given date of introduction by the domestic firm, the introduction of a second-generation product by the foreign firm does not affect the welfare of the home country. The only consequence of the foreign firm's entry is that, what used to be the instantaneous profits of the domestic firms now becomes the surplus captured by domestic consumers. Therefore, the home country would be better off if it could simply exclude the foreign firm from the market. This would ensure that the domestic firm introduces at its "stand alone" date r t L 1 * = , which is the same as the socially optimal date of introduction. Exclusion amounts to setting µ→∞. Any other tariff would eventually be overcome as the foreign firm would simply wait until the quality of its product had improved enough to overcome its unit cost disadvantage. The question, then, is whether the country can do better than this and capture some of the additional surplus created by the foreign firm. The answer to this question is "yes". Indeed, by setting an appropriate tariff, the home country can ensure that its domestic firm moves first, ensure that it does so at the socially optimal time r t L 1 = , and maximize the discounted value of its tariff revenues conditional on the foreign firm's moving last.
We assume that the home country can commit to a tariff level µ at time zero 15 . This tariff can drastically affect the nature of the subgame perfect equilibrium. Let us first consider the optimal waiting time of the follower. If the domestic firm moves last, its optimal waiting time is still r t f A 1 = . If the foreign firm moves last, however, its discounted profits are now:
15 The consequences of relaxing this assumption are discussed in Section 5.
Maximizing this expression with respect to t f results in an optimal entry date of
. Hence, the tariff increases the delay in entry of the foreign firm when it is a follower. Intuitively, the tariff does not affect the marginal gain from waiting since the firm can still fully appropriate any increase in quality beyond the quality offered by the domestic incumbent. On the other hand, the tariff decreases the marginal cost of waiting since it reduces the level of instantaneous profits that must be forgone 16 . Turning to the introduction time of the leader, we see that the "stand alone" entry date of the domestic firm is not affected by the tariff despite the fact that the domestic firm knows that the foreign follower will now introduce later. This is because, as mentioned earlier, the optimal delay of the follower only affects the discounted profits of the stand alone leader as a multiplicative factor,
. On the other hand, the stand alone entry date of a foreign leader is affected by the tariff in exactly the same manner as the foreign firm's optimal following delay: the tariff decreases the marginal cost of waiting but leaves the marginal benefit unchanged. More formally, we have:
Notice that this expression has the same form as that of We still need to determine the effect of the tariff on the pre-emption dates. In the symmetric case, t p was obtained by equating the discounted profits of a leader to the discounted profits of a follower. Because of the tariff, however, we must now distinguish between the pre-emption dates of the domestic and foreign firms. The pre-emption date of the domestic firm is the date that equalizes the discounted profits of that firm as a stand alone leader to its discounted profits as a follower, i.e., t L is such that:
which yields . Notice that this date is decreasing in µ: in the presence of a positive tariff the domestic firm is willing to move earlier than under free trade in order to move first. The intuition for this result is simple.
Conditional on a first entry date t L , the profit of the domestic firm as a follower is not affected by the tariff: it still introduces at r t L 1 + and makes instantaneous profits of r Nθ . On the other hand, for any given t L , the domestic firm's profits as a leader increase because the foreign follower now introduces its product later, i.e. the domestic leader now enjoys a longer period of monopoly. Hence, at the initial tariff-free pre-emption date t p , the domestic leader's profits with the tariff exceed the domestic follower's profits with tariff. This makes the domestic firm willing to move even earlier in order to be first. Similarly, the pre-emption date of the foreign firm is the date t L that equalizes the foreign firm's profits as a leader to its profits as a follower, i.e.: . This date is increasing in µ: in the presence of a tariff, the foreign firm is less willing to move early than under free trade in order to be first. The intuition is that, in the thought experiment that defines its pre-emption date, the foreign firm has an extra degree of freedom to react to the tariff when it is a follower. For a given date of introduction t p by the domestic leader, the foreign firm can adjust its own date of introduction to lessen the adverse effect of the tariff. On the other hand, the profits of the foreign firm as a leader are computed for the same given date of first introduction so that no such adjustment is possible. Hence, the foreign firm's profits as a leader are hurt more by the tariff than the foreign firm's profits as a follower.
In the free trade equilibrium we had r t t 
In the first of these two cases, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies has firm A introduce first at 
Proof: See Appendix ■
The level of home welfare under the optimal tariff policy is:
17 For a formal characterization of these equilibria, see Prokop, Regibeau and Rockett (1993) . The optimal tariff increases the welfare of the home country in three ways. First, it allows the domestic firm to introduce first at its preferred "stand alone" date of r t L 1 = , increasing its discounted profits. Second, the tariff raises the quality of the home product. This imposes a more severe competitive constraint on the foreign entrant, ensuring that domestic customers obtain a larger surplus after the introduction of the second-generation product by the foreign firm. Finally, the government collects positive discounted tariff revenues.
The foreign firm clearly suffers from the tariff due to the loss of tariff revenue and its later introduction date, but the effect of the tariff on world welfare is not a priori obvious: because we have inelastic demands, the tariff revenue is a pure transfer that leaves world welfare unchanged. In fact, the effect of the tariff on the dates of introduction lowers world welfare for two reasons. First, as we saw in our benchmark model, the worldwide optimal delay between the two introductions is equal to the delay, r 1 , that firms would choose under free trade.
The tariff increases this delay, resulting in a loss of welfare. Second, the tariff unduly postpones the introduction of the first generation product. Even though the date chosen under optimal tariff protection, r 1 , is optimal for the home country, it fails to take into account that later introduction also postpones the arrival of the superior second-generation product. In fact, as the worldwide optimal date of first introduction is almost identical to the equilibrium date of introduction under free trade 18 , the tariff-induced delay actually decreases world welfare. 
Administrative Delay
We analyse the case where country A may impose a delay, λ, on the foreign firm before it can actually sell its products in the home market. We assume that firm B cannot continue improving the quality of its product once the delay has begun, reflecting the idea that λ represents an administrative delay required to gain approval for sale of a particular product (as opposed to sale by a particular firm) in market A.
Let us now recalculate the equilibrium entry dates for the firms. If the foreign firm moves last, its discounted profits can be written as follows:
where f t is the time elapsed between the introduction of the home product and the date at which the foreign firm begins the approval process. Accordingly we will refer to f t as the "application delay". Note that, because the design of the product (and, hence, its quality) is fixed at the beginning of the administrative delay, the per period profit of the foreign firm does not include an allowance for an increment in quality while the approval process runs its course. Maximising this expression with respect to f t yields a profit-maximising delay of r t fB 1 = λ . This means that the foreign product is actually for sale in the market λ + r 1 later than the home product. The entry delay that would be chosen by a domestic follower is the same as in the baseline case, i.e.
If the foreign firm is a leader, its discounted profits can be written as follows: . Note that the administrative delay does not affect the per period profit that can be earned by the leader since quality is fixed at the beginning of the delay. Rather, the delay merely shortens the period during which profits can be earned. This is the case as long as the administrative delay is short enough that there is no change in the order of entry that has been assumed (i.e., the foreign firm is the leader and the domestic firm is the follower). In other words, the administrative delay must not exceed r 1 .
If the leader is the domestic firm, its profits can be written as: so that the administrative delay prolongs the profit period, but does not affect the trade-off that determines the optimal entry time. Therefore, the entry time for a domestic leader is the same as that of a foreign leader:
We can now assess the impact of an administrative delay on the preemption dates of the two firms. Equating the profits for a domestic leader to those of a domestic follower, substituting in the optimal waiting times of the followers, results in the following expression: . This is earlier than the pre-emption date in the baseline case. Intuitively, for a given date of first entry, L t , the administrative delay does not affect the domestic firm's discounted profits as a follower but it increases the profits of the domestic firm as a leader by delaying the introduction of the secondgeneration product. Hence, at the pre-emption time of the baseline case, the domestic firm has higher profits as a leader than as a follower so that it is willing to move even earlier in order to be first.
To obtain the foreign pre-emption date we equate the profits of the foreign firm, assuming that it leads, with the profits of the foreign firm, assuming that it is a follower: (18) so that the earliest date at which the foreign firm would be willing to pre-empt is ) ( the administrative delay hurts the discounted profits of a foreign follower less than those of a foreign leader because the fruitless period between application and actual introduction intervenes at a later date. This makes the foreign firm less eager to move early in order to be first.
Summarizing, an administrative delay λ does not affect the stand alone date of a domestic leader, delays the stand alone date of a foreign leader by exactly λ, decreases the pre-emption date of the domestic firm and increases the pre-emption date of the foreign firm. . In other words, just like the optimal tariff, the optimal delay ensures the best possible timing of product introduction for Country A but it does not yield any tariff revenue. Therefore, as long as tariffs are not bounded, the home country will maximize welfare by using its trade policy and will not discriminate against the foreign firm in its administrative approval process. Administrative delays will only be used if trade liberalization decreases the maximum allowable tariff significantly below r θ µ = .
We can now compute world welfare under the optimal delay, . Therefore, from the point of view of world welfare, the optimal tariff is preferable to the optimal administrative delay. This result is not a priori obvious since tariff revenues are a pure transfer that have no effect on world welfare and the date of first introduction is the same under both policies. The only differences between the two policies lie in the timing of introduction of second generation products and in their quality. On the one hand, second generation products are introduced earlier with the optimal delay than with the optimal tariff 21 . On the other hand, with the delay, the quality of the second generation product only keeps increasing over the interval between the first introduction and the date of application of the foreign firm. This is followed by a period of length λ* during which the product goes through the approval process without any further quality improvements. This contrasts with the tariff regime, where the quality of the second-generation product keeps increasing over the whole interval between the two introduction dates. This second effect dominates.
Finally, the foreign firm is better off under the optimal delay (earning discounted profits of 
Trade Liberalization
Trade liberalization often takes the form of mutually agreed reductions in quotas and/or tariffs. While significant effort has been expended to also restrict the use of other, less obvious, discriminatory policy instruments the results so far appear to have been modest. Accordingly, we will assume that "trade liberalization" sets an upper limit on the tariff that can be used by the home country but that it does not constrain the use of administrative delays.
The effects of a drastic trade liberalization are quite striking. If tariffs can no longer be used at all, the home country will switch from the optimal tariff policy to the optimal policy of delay. As we have just seen, this switch would result in lower welfare for the home country and the world, even though it would be applauded by the foreign firm. In other words, the prohibition of tariffs would force the home country to rely on an instrument that is less efficient both for itself and for the world economy.
The effect of less extreme degrees of trade liberalization is illustrated in figure 3 . The tariff cap is on the horizontal axis and the combination of tariff and delay that maximizes domestic welfare is on the vertical axis. Let us consider a progressive tightening of the tariff cap. For values of max
, the optimal policy of the home country is to set the maximum tariff allowed and not impose any administrative delay. Such a policy still ensures that the first introduction occurs at the optimal date r 1 and that the discounted value of tariff revenues is as large as possible. Interestingly, this policy is still optimal for a range below µ # : even though tightening the cap now implies that the domestic firm introduces earlier than r 1 , the home country still prefers not to use administrative delays. Intuitively, for values of µ close to µ#, the gains from pushing the introduction date back toward r 1 are small 22 . On the other hand, delaying the first introduction involves a significant decrease in the discounted values of the tariff revenues 23 . As the tariff cap is tightened further, however, one reaches a point where the marginal benefit of delaying the first introduction outweighs the marginal cost of pushing back the date at which tariff revenues are collected. From that point on the home country uses both the maximum possible tariff and a positive administrative delay.
As speeding up the date of introduction of the first product. However, once the domestic country begins to impose a substantial administrative delay, the date of introduction of the two products get pushed back so that further liberalization results in lower levels of world welfare.
Proposition 3 Moderate trade liberalization increases world welfare. Further liberalization gives rise to administrative delays and decreases world welfare.
Proof. See Appendix A.■ 6. Robustness
Credibility of the Tariff and Delay Policies
We have so far adopted the traditional timing of trade policy models and assumed that the level of tariffs and administrative delays could be committed to before the firms made their own choices. The extent to which governments can credibly commit to various types of economic policies is, however, as yet an unresolved empirical question. It is therefore interesting to examine how our analysis is affected if we vary the commitment power of the policy maker. The optimal administrative delay obtained in Section 4 remains optimal at any point of the game and is therefore credible in the absence of any exogenous commitment power. After the domestic firm moves first, the policy maker becomes indifferent between all possible values of the delay because, from then on, the instantaneous welfare of the country is equal to Nq A whatever the date of introduction and quality of the foreign follower. If the foreign firm were to move first then the administrative delay has no effect on the rest of the game so that, again, the policy maker is indifferent among all possible values of λ.
The optimal tariff policy derived in Section 3 clearly suffers from one type of time-inconsistency: once the foreign firm actually has introduced its own product, country A would wish to revise its optimal tariff. By setting a unit tariff equal to the quality advantage of the foreign product, country A would appropriate the entire surplus created by the second product introduction, leaving the foreign firm with zero profits. If there is any arbitrarily small but positive cost of entry, such an opportunistic policy on the part of country A would keep the foreign firm out of the industry altogether. Since country A is better off when the foreign firm enters one can say that, at the least, it has an incentive to commit not to revert to this opportunistic tariff policy if it possibly can.
On the other hand, r θ µ = remains the optimal value of the tariff as long as the foreign firm has not introduced its product. To see this, suppose that the home government could change the tariff once the home firm has introduced first. At that point, the home government only cares about maximizing the discounted value of its tariff revenues. The value of the superior quality embedded in second generation products is appropriated completely by the foreign firm and does not enter into the domestic welfare function. Hence, the government chooses the value of µ that maximizes: ∫ , which is the same as the optimal tariff that would be chosen at the beginning of the game.
Demand
We have assumed that consumer demand for either product is perfectly inelastic at any point in time. Inelastic demands have the convenient property that a monopolist would behave in a socially optimal way, as it is able to appropriate the whole consumer surplus created by its product. This helps to ensure that any departure from the socially optimal pattern of introduction has its source in the rivalry between the domestic and foreign firms. Still, inelastic demands have some important limitations. The first peculiarity of 0/1 demands is that import tariffs do not result in the usual deadweight loss. Hence, inelastic demands would appear to bias the world welfare comparison in favour of the tariff policy. This, however, is not necessarily correct. Consider a situation where the foreign firm moves after the domestic firm. The foreign firm will choose how long to wait and therefore will choose its quality advantage. If this quality advantage is large enough then the foreign firm can set its monopoly price without taking the presence of the domestic firm into account. In such a case, this monopoly price depends on the follower's marginal cost and therefore on the unit tariff. Hence a tariff would create a deadweight loss. If, on the other hand, the foreign follower chooses to enter with a non-drastic quality advantage then its profit-maximising price is constrained by the quality of the domestic firm's product and does not depend on its own marginal cost. Hence a tariff does not induce any deadweight loss. This latter situation is not pathological. The case of linear demands is considered in Appendix C. We show that a foreign follower always chooses a non-drastic differential. As we also show that the foreign firm moves second for any positive tariff, a unit tariff never induces a deadweight loss in equilibrium.
The second peculiarity of inelastic demands is that they allow each quality leader to appropriate fully the value of its quality advantage. This is why the home government was indifferent as to the precise level of quality attained by a foreign follower: the local consumers could not appropriate any part of this increased quality. To investigate the effect of this special feature, we reconsider the analysis of Sections 2 through 5 under the assumption that the foreign firm can only appropriate a fraction, α, of its quality advantage. Hence, the instantaneous profits of a foreign leader would be αθt L , and the profits of a foreign follower would be αθt f . When a tariff is imposed, we assume that a proportion, α, is borne by the foreign firm and a proportion, 1-α, by local consumers. Note that this assumption would hold for linear demands, where the proportion between profit and consumer surplus is independent of the tariff level. Alternative assumptions about the sharing of the tariff burden would not significantly affect the results.
With this specification, (1-α) enters all profit maximization problems as a multiplicative factor, leaving the dates of introduction of the leaders and followers as well as the "pre-emption" dates unchanged. Since these dates are independent of α, the effect of tariffs and delays on the behaviour of the firms remains as described in the previous sections. On the other hand, the welfare function of country A now includes some of the surplus created by the foreign firm so that country A now cares about not delaying overly the introduction of the foreign product. This makes the use of both delays and tariffs less attractive for two reasons. First, for a given date of introduction by the domestic leader, administrative delays and tariffs push back the introduction of the foreign good. Second, tariffs and delays also defer the date of introduction of the domestic leader, further postponing the introduction of the second product. Figure 4 illustrates the optimal tariff and delay policies as a function of α.
As expected, both instruments are used less aggressively when α is low. Interestingly, there is a critical value, α 0 , below which the optimal administrative delay is zero. The intuition for this discrete jump can be obtained from figure 5. Country A's welfare is made up of two parts. The first component, W1, is the value of the product of the domestic firm. This value is appropriated by the home firm from the first to the second introduction and by domestic consumers after that. W1 only depends on the delay λ through its effect on the date of introduction of the domestic product. As we saw in the previous sections, W1 is maximized by an introduction date of r 1 , which occurs for λ larger than λ 0 . Over this range, then, W1 is independent of α. Below λ 0 , W1 is increasing in λ. The second component, defined as W2, represents the share (1-α) of the foreign firm's quality advantage that is captured by country A. Since a larger delay pushes back the date of introduction of the foreign product and also freezes its quality for a longer period, W2 is decreasing in λ. The sum of W1 and W2 is two-peaked, with a local maximum at λ=0 and another one at λ* > 0. As the share of the foreign firm's quality advantage appropriated by the home country increases so does the relative importance of W2 and, therefore, the relative height of the λ=0 peak. For α < α 0 then, W is maximized at λ=0. While the introduction of the parameter α does not affect our positive results or the qualitative analysis of the home country's welfare it can change the implications of trade liberalization for world welfare. Since α only determines how surplus is shared between the foreign firm and country A it does not have any direct effect on world welfare. Its impact comes through the induced changes in the optimal policies of country A. As long as the optimal delay is positive, our previous conclusions still holds: world welfare is higher under country A's optimal tariff than under its optimal delay. Hence, drastic liberalization would lower world welfare. However, as soon as α hits the critical value for which the optimal delay jumps to zero, the policy conclusion is reversed: the optimal delay policy ensures the prevalence of free trade while the optimal tariff results in undesirably late introductions. Therefore, for α low enough, drastic trade liberalization would increase world welfare.
We examined the case of linear demands in some detail (see Appendix C). As with our α parameter, our positive results remain unchanged: a unit tariff increases both the stand alone and the pre-emption dates of a foreign leader, decreases the pre-emption date of a domestic firm and does not affect the domestic stand-alone date. The sign of the effect of an administrative delay on these critical dates is preserved as well.
The case of linear demands also displays the main features that we tried to capture above with the parameter α: the home country now benefits from the presence of the foreign firm. Again, this makes it less desirable to delay foreign entry through either a tariff or an administrative delay. Unfortunately, this is where the analogy ends because the type of free trade equilibrium that arises with linear demands is very different from that with 0/1 demands (for all values of α). Instead of entering at its pre-emption date (because t p < t L ) the first mover introduces at its stand-alone date (because t p > t L ). In such a stand-alone equilibrium the second mover makes larger profits than the first mover. This means that the home country would actually prefer the foreign firm to move first, so that delaying the foreign firm is never desirable. In other words, our analysis with the α parameter captures many features of the linear case, but the linear case itself is not a suitable framework for analysing discriminatory delays.
Conclusion
Various administrative procedures can be used to discriminate against foreign firms. Discrimination can occur either because foreign firms are treated unfairly or simply because the idiosyncrasies of the process favour the more experienced domestic firms. In this paper we focussed on the case of product approval where discrimination imposes additional delays on the introduction of new products by foreign competitors. We wished to compare the effects of such administrative delays with those of more traditional trade policy instruments such as tariffs. Using a simple model of the timing of product introduction we showed that both tariffs and delays postpone the date of introduction of both foreign and domestic products and allow the domestic firm to be first to market. We also established that, if both instruments are available, the domestic country prefers to only rely on the tariff. Although obtained for the special case of inelastic demands, these positive results are rather robust to changes in demand and cost conditions. We also compared welfare under the domestic country's optimal tariff policy to the level of welfare attained under its optimal delay policy. While the foreign country is better off with administrative delays, world welfare is higher under the optimal tariff. This implies that a drastic trade liberalization that bans the use of tariffs but is ineffective at controlling less transparent policies like delays would actually make the world worse off. In fact, one can show that, while imposing a binding cap on tariffs initially increases worldwide welfare, there is a level below which further tightening of the cap is undesirable. These normative results are significantly less robust than the results on the firms' behaviour. In particular, one can show that they are sensitive to the share of the quality advantage of the (late-moving) foreign firm that can be appropriated by domestic consumers. This in turn would depend on the precise specification of demand and on the type of competition between domestic and foreign firms. Our conclusion that drastic trade liberalization would decrease would welfare should therefore be taken as a cautionary tale, not as robust guidance for policy. A more general normative insight from the paper is that constraining the use of a subset of trade-related instruments does not necessarily lead to more palatable equilibrium policies. In terms of future work on this issue, one could clearly consider extensions of the framework proposed here. For example, an interesting modification of our analysis would be to allow both countries to have active trade policies. For this to affect our results, there must of course be some kind of link between the two markets. One natural assumption would be that simultaneous introduction in both markets is more economical than staggered entry.
How can we interpret the results of this paper and point to a way forward? When one goes to statements by practitioners and the press for a perspective on non-tariff barriers to trade -including administrative delays -one finds that several informal characteristics are signalled 25 . First, some non-tariff barriers are justified as means of correcting market failures (such as quality or compatibility failures), where there is some presumption that this correction should take place at the point of entry into the market. In our paper, there is a market failure in the sense that quality is too low in the pre-emption equilibrium, but the non-tariff barrier is also used as a device to capture rents. Second, some of these barriers are viewed as desirable because they are a less transparent means of discriminating than tariffs. Explanations along these lines have been proposed in the political economy literature, relying on the idea of information asymmetries to obtain inefficient policies in equilibrium 26 . Again, our paper does not include any informational issues, but does capture the same idea that an inefficient instrument is being used. Our approach is more related to a third theme in the practitioner literature: an idea that --without reference to informational issues or market failure issues --there may have been a shift in emphasis, including possible substitution, towards discriminatory non-tariff barriers that has been occasioned by trade liberalisation. These discriminatory non-tariff barriers are viewed as undesirable and not really in keeping with the intended benefits of trade liberalisation. In terms of relating this third view to the two alternative models we have outlined, unless one believes that information structures have changed over the years or that market failures have become more prevalent, neither of the first two explanations would result in such a change in reliance on different types of instruments over time as tariffs fall. Our point is precisely to focus on the possibility of substitution of one instrument for another as the tariff becomes constrained.
on food industry import requirements. Notice that a prevalent form of barriers in both are similar to the type we model here. A point made in the address on the first of these websites is that, to the extent that delays are "inevitable", a first step towards understanding them is to systematise and quantify them as well as analyse their effects. http://www.cuts-international.org/1997-2.htm discusses of some of the positive aspects of non-tariff barriers as well as the discriminatory aspects. 26 Coate and Morris (1995) suggest that inefficient methods of redistribution to special interests may be employed when they are less transparent to voters. In our model, countries would prefer to use the efficient instrument, as opposed to the Coate and Morris model where, for political reasons, the inefficient instrument is used as a matter of preference. 
Maximizing this expression with respect to µ yields r θ µ = * .
2. Showing that µ* is the globally optimal tariff for the home country when only the tariff may be used.
Welfare of country A is composed of two terms, as written above: a term that represents the sum of profits and consumers' surplus net of the tariff revenue, and a second term reflecting tariff revenue:
The first term is maximized at r t L 1 = . Therefore, to prove that the optimal tariff occurs for # µ µ > we need only show that the second term is maximized for # µ µ > . We maximize the following expression with respect to the tariff level: The first order condition of this maximization problem is:
where primes indicate first derivatives, and can be calculated as follows: In order to have an interior maximum the expression in square brackets in the first order condition must be equal to zero. This expression is positive at r t L 1 = and decreases in the tariff level (i.e., its derivative with respect to the tariff is negative for r θ µ < ). This implies that any possible interior solution must occur for r t L 1 > or, equivalently, for µ > µ#.
This means that the maximum of expected profit over the range ] # , 0
[ µ µ ∈ must be at a corner. Clearly, expected tariff revenues cannot be maximized for µ = 0. They cannot be maximized for µ=µ# either: at this point the expression for discounted tariff revenues is continuous and, by definition of r θ µ = * we know that discounted tariff revenues are higher at µ* than at µ#.
Derivation of the optimal entry dates for both firms when the home country can control both firms' entry dates
In order to derive the optimal entry dates for both firms from the point of view of country A, we must maximize welfare with respect to both the entry dates of the leader and the follower. Since consumers' surplus is the same as profits, country A's welfare is simply the expression for welfare at the beginning of Appendix section 2 with the tariff set to zero. This expression is independent of the entry date of the follower, indicating that the optimal entry date for the follower is indeterminate. Maximizing the expression with respect to the leader's entry date yields an optimal time of entry of r t L 1 = . Welfare of country A is the same as in the monopoly case, not surprisingly.
The optimal entry dates from the point of view of world welfare are calculated by maximizing world welfare with respect to the entry dates of the leader and the follower. The welfare of country A is as specified in the previous paragraph, while the welfare of country B is simply the discounted profits of the follower.
Maximizing world welfare yields a follower entry delay of r 1 (since the optimal date is indeterminate from the point of view of country A, and a delay of r 1 maximizes the follower's profits, as in the baseline case discussed in the text). The first order condition that determines the leader's entry date is: . This is earlier than the optimal entry date form the point of view of country A since world welfare takes into account country B's welfare, and from the point of view of country B, the leader's entry date merely serves to postpone the date at which profits will accrue to country B. At the world welfare maximizing entry dates for the two firms, welfare is as follows. 
Appendix B
We now assume that the foreign firm can only appropriate a share α of its quality advantage. We first show that the introduction of α does not affect the various dates of introduction. Clearly, the maximization problems of the domestic firm as a leader and as a follower do not depend on α. Similarly, the maximization problems of a foreign leader are: Results on optimal policies could not be obtained analytically for all ranges of parameters. We, therefore, relied on numerical simulations based on Maple V. The simulations are quite straightforward as the only parameters of the problem are θ and r. In fact, the only magnitude of relevance is the relative size of these two parameters, so that one can set 1 = θ and determine the optimal delay and tariff policies for different values of r. As the qualitative results are the same for all values of r, figures 4 and 5 in the text simply show a "typical" outcome. The expressions used in the simulations are: 
Appendix C
Consider a representative consumer. If this consumer purchases from firm j, he buys X j units, according to the following demand function:
Where Q j is the quality of good j and P j is the unit price of P j . If the consumers has to choose between the products offered by two firms i and j, he buys from the firm that would yield the greater consumer surplus. This implies that the consumer would purchase from j if and only if:
Hence firm j faces the following demand function:
To determine the optimal pricing behaviour of firm j we must distinguish between the case where it is not constrained by firm i and the case where it must 'limit price' to keep its rival at bay. Firm j is not constrained by firm i if P j -P i < (Q j -Q i )/b when P i = 0, i.e. if Q j > 2Q i . Over this range of qualities, firm j's profit maximising price is P j * = Q j /2b. This corresponds to sales of Q j /2 and profits of (Q j )
Behaviour of the Follower under free trade and with a unit tariff
We will derive the optimal behaviour of a foreign follower subjected to a unit tariff µ. The case of free trade and the case of the domestic follower are obtained by setting µ =0.
Let us first assume that the chosen quality differential is such that the pricing behaviour of the follower is constrained by the presence of the leader. This amounts to assuming that Let us now assume that the follower waits long enough to ensure that its pricing behaviour is not constrained by the presence of the leader. This amounts to assuming that (µb/θ) . Under this assumption, using the optimal price derived in the previous section, the objective function of the follower is 
For high values of t L , the follower chooses to introduce soon enough after the leader that its pricing behaviour is constrained, i.e. the follower sets a price just low enough to capture all sales. An important consequence is that the price chosen by the follower is not directly affected by the tariff rate. Hence there will be no deadweight loss from the unit tariff. For lower values of t L , the follower chooses a quality differential high enough that its unconstrained monopoly price can be charged. Since this price is directly affected by the tariff, there is a tariff-related deadweight loss over this range.
Stand-Alone Behaviour of the Leader
Assuming that t L ≥ 1/r (constrained follower), and maximising the discounted profits of the leader with respect to its introduction date, one gets
where µ is the tariff applied to the leader (i.e. µ = 0 for a domestic leader). Since t L * > 1/r for all µ ≥ 0, we are within the assumed range and hence have a local maximum. Assuming that t L < 1/r (unconstrained follower), and maximising the discounted profits of the leader with respect to its introduction date, one gets the following equation:
where t f = (2/r) + µb/θ -t L . Analytically, we can show that the root of this equation is never in the assumed range if θ ≤ e/2. For θ > e/2, we cannot get analytical results. However numerical simulations strongly suggest that the root of this equation is never within the assumed range. Typical simulation results are shown in the following table (for b = 1 and r = 0.1 so that the assumed range would be t L < 1/r = 10). We see that the date of introduction is always greater than 10 and is therefore out of the assumed range. Hence, the stand alone date of introduction is given by
This also implies that, in a stand alone equilibrium, the follower would always choose to limit-price. As mentioned above, this means that there is no direct tariffinduced static deadweight loss.
Pre-emptive Behaviour
For a given date of first introduction t L , the profit of a domestic leader who expects the foreign follower to limit price is The profits of a (limit-pricing) domestic follower would be:
Equating these two expressions leads the pre-emption date for a domestic firm under the assumption that followers would limit price: 
Since this expression is always larger than 1/r, the initial assumption about the range of t L -and thus about the limit pricing behaviour of follower -is verified. Hence we have a local maximum.
Following the same approach (and using numerical simulations), one can also show that the pre-emption dates obtained under the assumptions that followers (or at least one type of follower) would not limit price yields values for the preemption time that are outside of the assumed range. Hence, the correct expression for the pre-emption time is the one given above, involving limit-pricing by the foreign follower.
We now turn to the pre-emption date of a foreign leader. For a given date of first introduction t L , the profit of a foreign leader who expects the domestic follower to limit price is
The profits of a (limit-pricing) foreign follower would be:
Equating these two expressions leads to the following expression, defining the pre-emption date for a foreign firm under the assumption that followers would limit price: Numerical simulations show that this expression is always larger than 1/r, so that the initial assumption about the range of t L -and thus about the limit pricing behaviour of follower -are verified. Hence we have a local maximum.
Following the same approach (and using numerical simulations), one can also show that the pre-emption dates obtained under the assumptions that followers (or at least one type of follower) would not limit price yields values for the preemption time that are outside the assumed range. Hence, the correct expression for the pre-emption time is the one given above, involving limit-pricing by the domestic follower.
Free Trade equilibrium and Tariff
Under free trade, the two firms have the same stand-alone dates and the same preemption dates. In order to determine the equilibrium times of introduction of both foreign and domestic firms under free trade, we must rank these two dates. The following argument proves that, under free trade, the stand-alone date comes earlier than the pre-emption date. 
Hence G(µ) > ½ for µ = 0 so that, under free trade t L < t P . Moreover, there exists a value µ* such that t L ≤ t P ∀µ ≤ µ* and t L > t P ∀µ > µ*.
As seen in section 2 of this Appendix, the stand-alone date of introduction of a domestic leader is equal to t L = 2/r, which is independent of the tariff rate µ. The stand-alone date of the foreign firm is t L * = (2/r) +(µb/θ), which increases with µ.
Hence, starting from a position of free trade, a small tariff ensures that t L < t L * and that both dates are still smaller than the pre-emption dates. This means that the equilibrium is now such that the domestic firm moves always moves first, but the date of introduction is still the same as under free trade.
Turning to pre-emption dates we see that, as expected, t p decreases as µ increases. Moreover, for µ large enough, t p becomes smaller than the domestic stand-alone date t L . On the other hand, the foreign pre-emption date t p * increases with µ (the relevant root is the larger one). Its position relative to the stand alone date of the foreign firm is irrelevant: since t L < min(t L * ,t p * ), the equilibrium is such that the domestic introduces first at its own stand-alone date.
Overall, then the effects of a tariff on the four critical dates of introduction are the same as with 0/1 demands. However, because the free trade equilibrium is now of the stand-alone variety, the effect of a tariff on the equilibrium of the game is different: a tariff still ensures that the domestic firm moves first but it no longer affects the date of first introduction.
Administrative Delay
As in the text, we keep the notation t L , t p and t f for the dates at which the firm begins the approval process. The actual dates of introduction are then obtained by adding the administrative delay λ.
i.
Behaviour of a follower Given a date t L at which the foreign firm begins the approval process, the behaviour of a domestic follower is the same as before. Assuming that the domestic follower decides to wait sufficiently long that its profit-maximising price is not constrained by the presence of the first-mover, the domestic follower's profit is:
. At this date of introduction, the follower is in fact unconstrained -as assumed -if
Assuming that the domestic follower is in fact constrained by the presence of the foreign leader, the follower's profits are
which is maximised at r t f 1 = . At this date, our initial assumption that the follower was constrained is verified if
Moreover, for our calculation to be correct, we need the foreign firm to exercise its competitive constraint as soon as the domestic firm introduces. This requires that the administrative delay be no greater than t f , i.e. that λ ≤ 1/r.
We now turn to the behaviour of a foreign follower. Assuming that the follower's price is not constrained by the leader, the profit function is
which is maximised at ii.
Stand-alone date of a leader
The objective function of a domestic leader is Assuming first that the foreign follower is constrained, the above expression is maximised for r t L 2 = (A37)
As 2/r > 1/r we are indeed within the assumed range where the follower is unconstrained.
Assuming now that the foreign follower is unconstrained, the first order condition for maximising π L can be rearranged as We see that in all cases (and this is verified for other parameter values) the solution of the FOC is greater than 1/r, violating the initial assumption that the follower is not constrained. Hence, in a stand alone equilibrium where the domestic firm moves first the foreign follower always chooses its optimal introduction delay so that it is constrained by the domestic competitor.
We now turn to the stand-alone behaviour of a foreign leader. Its objective function is: As above, this assumes λ ≤ t f (see footnote 19 in the main text for a discussion). Assuming that the domestic follower chooses a delay so that its pricing is still constrained by the presence of the foreign leader (i.e. t L ≥ 1/r), we have t f = 1/r. Plugging this into the expression above and maximising yields t L = 2/r, which is within the assumed range. If we assume that the domestic follower chooses to wait long enough to escape the competitive constraint from the foreign leader, we have t f = (2/r) -t L . This means that the foreign leader's objective function is now which is maximised at t L = 2/r, which is out of the assumed range. Hence the stand-alone date of application of the foreign firm is 2/r and it is associated with limit-pricing (i.e. constrained maximising) by the domestic follower.
iii. Pre-emptive date of a leader
Assuming that the follower will choose to limit price (i.e. t L ≥ 1/r), the preemption date of the foreign firm is the date that equalises its profits as a leader and its profits as a follower, i.e. , this is within the assumed range. One can also show numerically that if we assume that t L < 1/r, so that a follower would not limit price, the resulting pre-emption time does not fall within this assumed range.
In a similar vein, the pre-emption date of the foreign firm is such that which is independent of λ and lies within the assumed range.
Domestic Welfare
As predicted, the welfare analysis differs sensibly from the analysis with 0/1 demands. The first difference is that, with linear demands, the domestic country does benefit from the presence of the foreign firm even if it cannot collect tariff revenues. To see this, assume that the domestic firm moves first and compare domestic welfare at any point before foreign entry to domestic welfare at any point after foreign entry. 
where T is the tariff revenue. It is clear that SS E > SS M , despite the fact that, after entry, the domestic firm does not earn any profit. The key to this result is that, because in equilibrium there is limit pricing, the domestic firm exercises a sufficient competitive constraint on the foreign firm to keep prices low. With an elastic demand, this prevents the foreign firm from extracting the entire extra surplus associated with the higher quality of the product so domestic consumers are now better off after entry.
In spite of this difference, the stand-alone date of the domestic firm is still socially optimal for the home country, taking the foreign follower's behaviour as given. The welfare of the domestic country is given as Under free trade (i.e. µ = 0), this expression is maximised at r t L 2 = , i.e. the same as the stand-alone date of a domestic leader. Hence, just as in the case of 0/1 demands, conditional on the domestic firm moving first, a domestic planner would not want to change the date of initial entry as long as we are in a standalone equilibrium. Since the equilibrium is always of the stand-alone type, there is no need to tinker with the domestic firm's date of introduction.
The second major difference has to do with the order of moves. The previous discussion assumed that the domestic firm moved first and that this order of moves was, as in the case of 0/1 demand, desirable for domestic welfare. However -and this is the crucial difference between linear and inelastic demands -we are now in a situation where the domestic country would prefer its own firm to move second. The intuition for this is straightforward. In a free-trade equilibrium, consumer surplus is the same whether the domestic or the foreign firm moves first (everything is perfectly symmetrical). On the other hand, the fact that we have a stand-alone equilibrium precisely means that the discounted profits of the leader are smaller than the discounted profits of the follower. In other words it is because, at the stand alone date, the follower's profits are higher than the leader's that the pre-emption date comes later: there is no desire to move early in order to be first. As consumer surplus is the same irrespective of the order of moves and the profits of the domestic firms are higher if it moves second, domestic welfare is enhanced if one can induce the foreign firm to move first. Starting from such a free-trade equilibrium, administrative delays that discriminate against the foreign firm cannot be optimal: they do not affect the date of first introduction and induce the wrong order of moves. Hence, with linear demands, the model does not provide a sensible framework for analysing discriminatory administrative delays.
